

## NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENSE AND NONVIOLENCE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

BY

MR. NAJIB MAHMOOD  
United States Department of State

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# USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## **NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENSE AND NONVIOLENCE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM**

by

Mr. Najib Mahmood  
United States Department of State

Dr. Larry Goodson  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **ABSTRACT**

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The end of the Cold War and the events of 9/11 have provided strategic planners with unprecedented challenges and opportunities. One such challenge is how to deal with an elusive enemy that has no recognizable territory or organized army; yet has shown a remarkable resilience against traditional military firepower. On the other hand, the post-Cold War era has provided us with enormous peace dividends that can be utilized to enhance the quality of life for millions of people around the world. However, if these dividends are spent on unsound and archaic tactics to defeat the new enemy, we will squander an historic opportunity for our flawed strategies. This project provides the strategic leaders with an alternative approach to traditional military thinking of Offensive Defense and pre-emptive violent strikes. It describes the viability of Non-Offensive Defense and nonviolence strategy for creation of a sustainable and just world Peace.



## NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENSE AND NONVIOLENCE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Like any social or corporate cultures, the military culture evolves from its mission statement and its strategic posture. The mission to fight and win wars has developed the military culture of sacrifice, honor, discipline, patriotism, and unquestioned obedience to lawful authority. However, there lurks the inevitable danger of inadvertent byproducts in the mission-centered military culture of winning at all costs: insensitivity, injustice, jingoism, and even unintended compromise of morality and principle. To address the negative impact of these unintended evils on the mission and on the national policy, strategic leaders must have the capacity to question outdated practices and superfluously framed policies in order to re-evaluate the mission goals or to realign its strategic posture.

### Thinking Outside the Box

The primary mission of the military is and shall remain to win wars; thus not much can be done regarding goal-setting to alleviate the unintended negative consequences of wars. So, strategic leaders must explore alternative military postures that may minimize the risk of damage to universal moral values, justice, and the harmony of human society. It is this virtue of out-of-the-box thinking and willingness to challenge established but non-effective and irrational policies that distinguish a strategic leader from a mere bureaucratic operative. Accordingly, the strategic leaders must be receptive to unorthodox transformations that may shake their traditional convictions and beliefs -- transformations that are products of logical analyses or lessons learned and are manifested as a change in the strategic posture or mission of the organization.



This essay challenges the Offensive Defense (OD) character of the current US military policy, which has produced mixed results at best. The essay explores other defense policy options that are more relevant to the realities of the twenty-first century. It describes the alternative Non-offensive Defense (NOD) strategy and explains why such a revolutionary transformation would increase military efficiency without sacrificing its mission effectiveness, while eliminating the dilemmas of unintended consequences of war.

The biggest challenge for the US defense strategists is whether the current ambitious and open-ended global objectives of US foreign policy can be supported militarily and whether the existing US military posture that is modeled on a Cold War scenario can still respond to the post-Cold War and post-9/11 foreign policy imperatives. Consider these two overriding questions: Is the US military appropriately structured to respond to the tactical challenges specific to post-Cold War and post-9/11 concerns?, And does the US national defense strategy and posture effectively address the realities of the new world order in the twenty-first century and beyond?

The current US national security policy seeks to defend and expand democracy and open markets; to contain and continue to roll back communism; and to stamp out terrorism and extremism. The US pursuit of these formidable objectives has produced varied political and military results. While the US policy has succeeded in reducing the threat of communism, it has been less triumphant in expanding democracy in regions other than Eastern European countries; it has certainly fallen short in eliminating or even reducing the threat of terrorism and extremism. Nevertheless, the US annual military expenditures have more than doubled since the end of the Cold War, while the

image of the United States as the champion of human rights, freedom, and justice has been significantly tarnished around the world. Whether these outcomes are the unintended consequences of an otherwise visionary policy, the unfortunate side effects of an appropriate campaign, or the inevitable results of an unrealistic strategy, it behooves our strategic leaders to reassess and reevaluate all aspects of the National Security policy through a more viable strategic planning in the future.

Strategic leaders must consider all options as they craft visionary plans in their disciplines. However, the plans must remain faithful to their strategic goals and not be derailed by tactical and expedient deviations. Unfortunately, at the conclusion of the Cold War, the attention of the policy-makers in the US and elsewhere shifted narrowly to conversion and societal transformation of Eastern Europe. This strategic effort was immediately followed by a direct focus on defeat of terrorism and extremism after the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks on US soil. Thus, post-Cold War opportunities to rethink the National Security Strategy and reap anticipated peace dividends were squandered. Instead, the long term and strictly military strategic issues were pushed back for tactical military and political concerns, to include societal transformations such as democratization, establishing social justice, stabilization, and reconstruction.

In order to refocus the national defense policy on long-term strategic goals, we must seriously consider alternative defense postures that are more relevant to the realities of the new world order. One such alternative is the Non-Offensive Defense (NOD) strategy that has been endorsed by a majority of nations, to include Russia and the European countries<sup>1</sup>. The promise and the strength of the NOD strategy is based on its tremendous political, economic, and moral appeal for a just and peaceful world order.

At its core, it promotes true multinational commitment and international cooperation as a safeguard against aggression. Furthermore, it offers pragmatic defensive tactics along with visionary prospects for a viable and lasting world peace.

### Principles of Non-Offensive Defense

The principle theory of non-provocative or non-offensive defense (NOD) is simple: that armed forces and military postures should be re-structured with a view to maximize their defensive and minimize their offensive capabilities. The purpose as Moller and Wiberg describe is at least threefold:

- to facilitate arms control and disarmament by eliminating one element in competitive arms build-ups, namely reciprocal fears;
- to strengthen peace by ruling out preemptive and preventive wars;
- to provide effective yet non-suicidal defense options.<sup>2</sup>

One can identify a number of precursors of the modern NOD idea, including Liddell Hart of the 1920s and 1930s, and various post World War II planners. In the United States, a certain interest in defensive restructuring had existed for several years in the academic community. However, what placed NOD on the international agenda was the unexpected adoption of the idea by the former Soviet Union in 1986-87. Until then, Western NOD proponents had only hoped for achieving an NOD-like defensive restructuring of the (extremely offensive) Soviet forces in an indirect way: by first persuading Western states to restructure and subsequently forcing the USSR to emulate, for instance through arms control negotiations.

NOD might seem largely forgotten in the post-Cold War world, where academic, political and public attention has been directed to the urgent tasks of conversion and societal transformation in the former East. Strictly military problems, in the old sense at least, have been pushed into the background. However, its success in the 1980s resulted in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks that significantly reduced the offensive capability of conventional weapons in Europe.

The fundamentals of the NOD strategy are to ensure all nations' lack of capability to wage wars and a strong international ability to defend against wars. It provides a bold incentive for non-aggression and discourages any inclination to wage wars.

Nevertheless, NOD is not about weapon types but about overall military formation and structure. It requires a defensive restructuring of military postures, combined with a sincere realignment of political goals and aspirations. For the NOD strategy to succeed, the energy of the national defense resources as well as academic dialogues must shift from how to win wars to how to avoid and prevent wars. The resulting shift in priority prompted by the NOD scheme, according to Moller and Wiberg, "should contribute to disarmament and thus allow for a conversion from military to civilian production and resource consumption."<sup>3</sup> The economic returns on this conversion should undoubtedly be substantial, raising the standards of living for millions of people around the world.

Aggressive agenda-driven foreign policies such as the former Soviet Union's desire to spread communism, Adolf Hitler's ambition for racial superiority, or the US resolve to promote democracy are incompatible within NOD strategy. In an NOD world, such agendas must be tempered and restrained as options for national alignment and

internal governance so they do not impact global and international commitments to stability.

The idea that the risk of war increases when defense policies are based on offensive military thinking and decreases when defense policies are based on defensive, or non-provocative, thinking is not a new one. Nor is the idea that international security in general will be improved if defensive elements are integrated into the defense policies of states and alliances. Thus, ideas promoting non-provocative defense were not novel when they began receiving attention in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period marked by deteriorating East-West relations that culminated in the build-up of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces, and plans by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to modernize its Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF). Actions by both the East and the West at this time appeared to reflect a reversion to what has been widely regarded as a central problem in international relations: the so-called security dilemma, defined as “the dynamic in which one state’s effort to increase its security are perceived as being achieved at the expense of another state’s security, promoting a spiral of completion that usually manifests itself in an arms race that, ultimately, leads to war.”<sup>4</sup>

What is the security dilemma, and is it sufficiently important phenomenon to justify a new approach to defense? The idea of a security dilemma in international relations has a long history and is well described in the literature. In the Early 1950s, an explicit concept known as the ‘security dilemma’ was fully outlined by John Herz:

Whenever...anarchic society has existed – and it has existed in most periods of known history on some level – there has arisen what may be called the ‘security dilemma’ of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are,

concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of the others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.<sup>5</sup>

Writing about the security dilemma later, in 'the atomic age', Herz argued that "nowhere, perhaps, has the compelling force of the security dilemma become more noticeable than in the sphere of armaments."<sup>6</sup> He asserted that the Cold War's bipolarity had given the security dilemma its utmost poignancy. In describing bipolarity's effects, he observed:

Whatever the security interests of one side seems to require increases the insecurity of the other side, and hardly any line can be drawn which would separate 'defensive' measures and 'security' policies from 'offensive,' 'expansionist,' and 'beyond-security' actions.<sup>7</sup>

In short, defensive theorists tended to view the security dilemma as central to international relations. Defensive theories' distinctive contribution to the concept was the idea that armaments acquired for defensive purposes might be misinterpreted by others as offensive, thus setting off an action-reaction cycle. The intuitively reasonable solution was to develop demonstrably defensive systems that help ameliorate the competitive, destabilizing, and war producing effects of the security dilemma. However, this raises the issue of the feasibility of this solution, and whether this view of the dilemma is so narrowly defined that it fails to describe enough real security situations to justify being a viable general doctrine. Furthermore, the defensive view of the security dilemma can be challenged on grounds that it exaggerates both the extent to which the dilemma is actually present in relations between states and the role of arms races in those relations.

A critical problem with security dilemma is that it emerged under Cold War conditions and was clearly influenced by them. As a consequence most theories concentrated on escaping or mitigating a security dilemma rather than avoiding new dilemmas. Thus, the question arises whether this focus remains justified when civil wars appear to be more prevalent than international conflict, and whether defensive force postures remain relevant when war is waged by non-state entities and groups rather than organized states.

Critics have raised questions whether security dilemma theories have been too dependent on Cold War assumptions about East-West bipolar rivalry in conditions of nuclear competition, and whether new security dilemmas have arisen in the post-Cold War international security environments that need attention.

It should be noted that most concepts of non-provocative defense have been based on the view that war is caused by arms races and the security dilemma. Defensive advocates have the right to argue that by adopting more manifestly defensive strategies and forms of military organization, states and alliances could help resolve some Cold War security dilemmas and lessen the risk of war. However, the assumption that arms racing are the primary causes of war can be argued to the contrary based on historical considerations. Arms race is only one of several factors that explain the outbreak of war in 1914, and it was not a main cause of the Second World War. Moreover, it was not an arms race between Iraq and Kuwait that led to the Gulf war, although arms racing between the region's larger states did worsen the political climate, affecting the region's smaller states, most notably Kuwait.

## NOD and Terrorism

The question arises whether non-offensive defense can address the concerns of War on Terror and whether a nonviolent approach to terrorism is a viable strategy. We will discuss the concept of nonviolence as part of NOD later in this essay; nevertheless, scholars have already started working on devising ways to deal with the dilemma of terrorism within the NOD concept. At the United States Institute of Peace, Paul Stares and Monica Yacoubian have developed an innovative framework for strategizing against terrorism. They propose an epidemiological approach that treats militancy as if it were a virus or mutating disease.<sup>8</sup> The first challenge is to contain, the second is to protect those who are threatened by it, and the third is to remedy the conditions that foster its spread. Protective measures include controlling the movement of individuals in countries of concern, blocking the transmission of extremist ideology, and mobilizing moderate voices to promote nonviolent forms of political expression. Preventive measures include resolving political disputes that motivate armed violence, addressing conditions that gave rise to militancy, and reducing social marginalization within Muslim countries and European Diaspora communities. The cure will take many years, Stares and Yacoubian emphasize.<sup>9</sup>

At the Madrid International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and Security in March 2005, the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change urged "a global strategy of fighting terrorism that addresses root causes and strengthens responsible states and the rule of law and fundamental human rights."<sup>10</sup> In April 2006 the Secretary-General reiterated the call to "reinforce the inexcusability and unacceptability of terrorism, while working to address the conditions that terrorists exploit."<sup>11</sup> He urged greater efforts to promote democracy and representative



government, end military occupation, reduce poverty and unemployment, and halt state collapse. In September 2006 the White House released a new National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which declared that the fight against terrorism is not only a battle of arms but a “battle of ideas.” The document called for “the creation of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists.”<sup>12</sup> It urged the advancement of freedom and human dignity and greater efforts to resolve disputes peacefully and promote the rule of law.

The UN policy Working Group on Terrorism in 2002 concluded, “Terrorism is ...essentially a political act. To overcome the problem of terrorism it is necessary to understand its political nature as well as its basic criminality and psychology.”<sup>13</sup> For many Americans, deeply scarred by the horrors of September 11, acknowledging the political grievances of Al-Qaida and related networks may seem offensive. Explaining why the terrorists attacked can sound like appeasement or a justification for their crimes. The point is not to excuse such acts, however, but to understand why they occurred and to use this knowledge to prevent such attacks in the future. “It is difficult to envision how one can address the terrorism phenomenon,” writes Telhami, “without addressing the central issues that create the fertile grounds for breeding terrorism and that are exploited by organizers.”<sup>14</sup>

No form of terrorism is more lethal or more horrifying in its psychological impact than suicide bombing. It is difficult to deter those who are prepared to die to carry out their mission. The suicide bomber is able to strike with terrifying accuracy to murder the largest number of people and thus sow the greatest amount of emotional and social disorder. It is worth noting that prior to 1968 the phenomenon of suicide terrorism was

practically unknown. In recent years the danger has increased dramatically. There were three times more suicide bombings in the four years after September 11 than in the previous thirty years.<sup>15</sup> In his detailed study of the subject, political scientist Robert Pape points out that nearly half of all worldwide fatalities from terrorist violence from 1980 through 2003 have resulted from suicide attacks.<sup>16</sup>

Empirical evidence shows that suicide terrorism is motivated by a desire to end military occupation. Nearly all the political scientists and sociologists who have studied the phenomenon agree, writes reviewer Christian Caryl, that “the organizations using suicide attacks have been fighting to evict an occupying power from a national homeland.”<sup>17</sup> More than 90 percent of the 315 suicide terrorist attacks in Pape’s database were motivated by a desire to remove foreign forces from territory that militants claimed as their homeland. These attacks occurred as part of organized campaigns to compel adversaries to “withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland.”<sup>18</sup> UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s April 2006 report noted that “suicide terrorism campaigns often occur in the context of foreign occupation or perceived foreign occupation.”<sup>19</sup> Whether in Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Chechnya, Palestine, or Iraq, suicide bombing have had a common purpose and political agenda: to achieve political self-determination and drive out what are seen as foreign occupation forces. This helps to explain the grim pattern of relentless suicide attacks in Iraq and has ominous implications for the US itself. “The presence of nearly 150,000 American combat troops in Iraq,” writes Pape, can only give suicide terrorism a boost, and the longer this campaign continues the greater the risk of new attacks in the United States.”<sup>20</sup>

To combat terrorism, much attention has focused on the financing of terror. Efforts to freeze and cut off financial support for terrorists' activities have been a centerpiece of the UN counter-terrorism program. These efforts have had some success in reducing the funds available to Al-Qaida. The methods employed are essentially the same as those used in the fight against money laundering and narcotics trafficking. However, the financing of terror differs fundamentally from financial crime. Terrorists are motivated by political concerns, not economic greed. They may resort to crime or predatory commodity trade to finance their activities, but their mission is primarily political, not economic. The financing of terror also involves much smaller amounts of money than financial crimes. The September 11 attacks cost less than \$500,000, whereas the drug barons of Colombia annually launder hundreds of millions of dollars.<sup>21</sup> Terrorist networks often rely on informal *hawala* money-transfer systems and couriers to transfer funds, a system that is extremely difficult to trace. According to the staff report of the 9/11 Commission, "There is little evidence that bin Laden and his core Al-Qaida members used banks"<sup>22</sup> to finance the attacks against the United States. Thus, it is essential to remain focused on the political underpinnings of terrorism and not merely look to eradicate their symptomatic and operational tools.

The primary strategic objectives are to separate hard-core militants from their support base and to render the use of terrorist methods illegitimate. President Bush emphasized this approach during an August 2004 television interview. When asked if the United States could win the war on terror, the president replied, "I don't think you can win it. But I think you can create conditions so that those who use terror as a tool are less acceptable in parts of the world."<sup>23</sup> This means addressing the "demand side"

of terrorism to ensure that the vacuum created by the destruction of a particular terrorist cell is not quickly filled by the other aspirants.<sup>24</sup> It means cutting the cord of terrorist formation by halting the flow of recruits and money and undermining political support.

Ultimately, the struggle against terrorism is a political battle. It is not a military campaign, wrote Fukuyama, but a “contest for the hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims around the world.”<sup>25</sup> The 9/11 Commission argued that the goal of US strategy must be to prevail over the ideology that contributes to Islamic terrorism. This should be easy for a democratic country founded on principles of freedom. Winning the fight against terrorism means living up to American ideals of justice, equality, and the rule of law. It means working cooperatively in the world rather than unilaterally, acting with humility rather than arrogance. In this way the United States can speak and act with moral authority in dissuading others from supporting terrorism. It can offer hope and a positive vision for the future to overcome the ideology of hatred.

In spite of the above, the proponents of the current War in Iraq as well as the Bush Administration argue, perhaps rightly, that, “regardless of how we got here, we are here.” Then they go on to draw the conclusion that we must “stay the course. What we are doing is working. It just needs more time, more troops, and more money.”<sup>26</sup>

Translated into actual events and projected plans, the statement flows as follows: On January 10, 2007, President Bush revealed a plan, that would according to William Polk “totally Americanize the war in Iraq.”<sup>27</sup> Per Terrell Arnold, former deputy director of counterterrorism, the plan would put “almost all of American energy in Iraq behind a military campaign to squelch Iraqi resistance.”<sup>28</sup> William Polk asserts that “This, in short, is not just rhetoric or speculation: it is made up of operational plans, dedicated military

personnel, with already positioned weapons sustained by an already allocated budget.”<sup>29</sup> While this is alarming; however, the future of the US policy in Iraq is uncertain and is being fiercely debated in the current US presidential election campaigns. Nevertheless, former President Dwight Eisenhower gave us an insightful view about war when he said:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children...This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.<sup>30</sup>

### Nonviolence

It is clear that nations plan their grand strategies primarily to protect and promote their national interests and their way of life, both domestically and abroad. However, heavy-handed tactics employed by aggressive states in the name of their national interest are hardly in accord with universal morals; such tactics disrupt international order for peaceful coexistence and mutual respect. The militaristic view that if we kill enough militants the threat will go away has proved the contrary: it appears that the more firepower unleashed to resolve conflicts the more jihadists turn up to reciprocate the violence. As stated before, the number of major terrorist incidents around the world has more than tripled since the US-led coalition invaded and occupied Iraq. It is therefore imperative that we reevaluate the current militaristic strategies to make them more effective by ways that curb the level of violence.

However, this section does not focus on the historical achievements or tactics of nonviolence. Instead, it explores the theoretical and philosophical aspects of

nonviolence strategy and its effects whereas to deter war and constrain terrorism and other extremist threats. It advances a definition of war and victory as viewed by nonviolence theory. Finally, it analyzes the capability of nonviolence to achieve a lasting peace.

Some theorists have hypothesized that human conflict can be resolved only through violent exertion of power over the opponents. For example, in his explanation of war as human intercourse, Clausewitz concludes that war is “a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed.”<sup>31</sup> This outlook in some way assumes that bloodshed is the inevitable means to resolve human conflicts and regards diplomatic and nonviolent alternatives as essentially futile. Furthermore, Clausewitzian theories offer little insight into the aftermath of violent wars, which renders his theories irrelevant to the realities of modern conflicts.

There is a perception among some war theorists that nonviolence is a passive strategy adopted by idealists who hope for a utopian world. On the contrary, there is historical evidence that this perception could not be farther from the reality. In the late 1980s, the spectacular success of the nonviolent Velvet Revolution in Eastern Europe transformed Poland and the Czech Republic into viable democracies. The other Eastern European states have used similar strategies of nonviolence to make significant strides towards freedom and democracy at one level or another. These recent examples demonstrate that nonviolence is neither passive nor utopian. Indeed it has produced positive results in even the most uncertain post Cold War political environments.

Furthermore, there are numerous examples of colossal social changes that are the direct products of active nonviolent campaigns – the achievements of the United

States civil rights movement of the 1960s and the women's suffrage protests of the 1910s are a few shining examples of the success of a strategy of nonviolence. This strategy has also yielded impressive results in campaigns for independence and freedom. M. K. Gandhi's persistent nonviolent campaigns for freedom in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century paved the way for India's independence and arguably triggered the independence of many other states from the British colonial rule.

Nonviolent strategy considers bloodshed as counterproductive; rather, it focuses on alternative means of diplomacy and persuasion for conflict resolution. Diplomatic persuasion eliminates human and material costs of wars; it also elevates the stature of the nonviolent nation as a responsible and trustworthy partner. In contrast, violent conflicts have invariably divided and demoralized aggressor nations internally and robbed them of their moral authority to promote or protect their interests and values abroad. Accordingly, strategists should now reassess the utility of violent wars as the means to resolve differences. A philosophical transformation can enable us to devise a more viable means to resolve human conflicts in a complex world.

The German philosopher Georg Hegel views the natural world as the interaction of contending forces (thesis and antithesis) that progress to the ultimate truth (synthesis). The ultimate truth in this explanation is not defined and remains relative and unpredictable. However, if the ultimate truth results in a harmonious human society, then wars must be waged with only the ultimate truth and justice as the desired outcome. Gandhi contends that in the history of human society the dominance of truth is inevitable and "the way to truth has always won."<sup>32</sup> In the Gandhian adaptation of

Hegelian philosophy in which the social classes are the contending forces, the higher truth is synthesized through tolerance, love, and mutual understanding.

Since the objective of ultimate truth is a tenuous and relative concept, nonviolence strategists build their campaigns on the more certain and definable concept of means. Therefore, adoption of moral means to achieve strategic objectives is the cornerstone of nonviolence strategy. Activist A. J. Muste posits that there is no way to peace, peace is the way.<sup>33</sup> Thus, the means employed to achieve the objective shapes the outcome, and implementation of moral means leads to moral ends. According to Gandhi, “if one takes care of the means, the end will take care of itself.”<sup>34</sup> Gandhi believed that nonviolence is an indispensable means to finding the truth and assuring just outcomes.

In the Gandhian approach, nonviolence thus invokes the outcome rather than serving to achieve the end. In other words, the means are the ends. Political philosopher Hannah Arendt similarly concludes, “Since the end of human action...can never be reliably predicted, the means used to achieve political goals are more often than not of greater relevance to the future world than the intended goals.”<sup>35</sup> Thus, according to nonviolence principles, war can be defined more appropriately as a persistent moral campaign waged to produce a just outcome in a conflict. According to this strategy, victory is achieved by adopting nonviolent means. In such a campaign, a firm adherence to what Gandhi calls *Satyagraha* or “persistent truth” provides the self-awareness and disciplined deliberation necessary to achieve the just ends.

In the practical adaptation of a strategy of nonviolence, activists including Gandhi have accepted limited use of force and coercion as long as such force does not cause physical harm. Moreover, this strategy distinguishes between force and violence, so it



posits that the use of force is not necessarily violent. Nonviolence theorist Walter Wink asserts that force can also mean “legitimate, socially authorized, and morally defensible use of restraint to prevent harm being done.” Violence, on the other hand, is “the morally illegitimate or excessive use of force.”<sup>36</sup> It should be noted, however, that nonviolent action is not free of ambiguity; further, it does not distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. Boycotts and strikes, for example, may interrupt vital services and cause hardships for the general public. However, as long as such action avoids physical harm and does not threaten life, activist David Cortright argues it would be “morally justifiable.”<sup>37</sup>

The biggest challenge facing nonviolence strategists is how their strategy can counter terrorism, random killing, and mass murder adopted by extremist networks or militarized government policies that advocate and perpetrate horrific violence. Activist David Cortright contends that, “The ambiguities of seeking justice in an imperfect world sometimes require coercive measures, especially when the challenge is protecting innocent victims.”<sup>38</sup> Gandhi admitted that using nonviolence against someone like Hitler would not be effective without much sacrifice and pain. But then he also questioned whether there were any wars waged without pain and sacrifice. Gandhi professed that in a nonviolent campaign, the activist must be prepared to die like a soldier for the cause of just peace. However, he advised that under no circumstance would the activist be justified to kill.

Gandhi’s doctrine for dealing with violence is to expose the injustice and cruelty of the tyrant through accepting pain and openly bearing unjust punishment in the hands of the tyrant. He believed that this strategy triggers a deeply human response so that it

decreases the bully's hatred and increases his respect towards his victim. Yet beyond this phenomenon, the primary ways to counter against terror and violence are prevention and transformation. Nonviolence strategists focus on identifying and transforming the underlying dynamics that lead to violent conflicts. To prevent armed conflicts, it is essential to identify and address the underlying grievances and conditions that give rise to violence. This requires us to understand the perceived injustices that drive the affected to violence and then to garner support for militant groups to alleviate the factors that contribute to their violent behavior. This by no means suggests that we appease criminals. Rather, we should seek to know the causes of violence and the ways to prevent such attacks in the future.

Ultimately, if despair or get confused in the fog and frictions of wars, we can seek solace in the words of Gandhi, "When in despair I remember that all through history the way of truth and love has always won; there have been tyrants and murderers, and for a time they can seem invincible, but in the end they always fall."<sup>39</sup>

The details of the tactics and application of Nonviolent approach and Non-Offensive Defense strategy are beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that the greatest opposition to NOD strategy comes, not from rogue and outwardly belligerent states, but from the larger, more mainstream nations. Global military superpowers have the inherent ability to project armed forces across national borders and over long distances, which is incompatible with the NOD concept. Carl Conetta describes the superpower possession and projection of force as a dilemma for NOD: "Although global military powers need not serve the type of objectives pursued by, say, a Genghis Khan, Napoleon or Hitler – it [superpower capability] does imply, at

the least, exclusive prerogative for the nations that possess it.”<sup>40</sup> Thus, divestiture of superpower status and elimination of aggressive power projection are primary requirements in the NOD world order, which perhaps explains the marginalization of NOD efforts among superpower states.

### Conclusion

Rationales for the NOD strategy include its potential contributions to a prosperous, just, and peaceful world order. This potential has been well-researched and documented by political and military scholars on both sides of the Atlantic for more than five decades. Thus, NOD along with Nonviolence strategy provides a viable alternative doctrine that can ensure a sustainable and just world peace.

In today’s world, nations have entered into symbiotic relationships and no longer rely on military conquests, as in the Clausewitzian era. The victor today benefits only if the loser is left with an assured path to stability and prosperity after the end of their conflict. Defeat and total destruction of the enemy are no longer viable goals of war. As Liddell Hart said, “The object in war is a better state of peace – even if only from your own point of view.”<sup>41</sup> Therefore, leaving a gift of stability and a higher moral legacy with the enemy is crucial to the ultimate success in a conflict.

There has never been a better opportunity or a more pressing moral imperative for US strategists to utilize the unique leadership position of the US in steering the world towards that desired end. For this to be achieved, the question is no longer the necessity or viability of alternative political and military strategies. Rather, the issue is the capacity and courage of strategic leaders to step beyond their traditional deliberative

boundaries and simply do what their privileged profession and leadership position requires – think outside the box.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Bjorn Moller and Hakan Wiberg, *Non-Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century* (Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), 3.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, 1

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, 6

<sup>4</sup>Adam Roberts, “*The Idea of Defensive Defence: Historical Aspects.*” Paper delivered at the British International Studies Association Annual Conference, (University of Kent, Canterbury, 18-20 December 1989), 3.

<sup>5</sup>John Herz, “*Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,*” *World Politics*, vol.2, no.2 (1950), 157.

<sup>6</sup>John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (1959) (reprint, New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 242.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, 241.

<sup>8</sup>Paul Stares and Monica Yacoubian, “Terrorism as a virus,” *Washington Post*, 23 August 2005.

<sup>9</sup>United States Institute of Peace, “Rethinking the War on Terror,” briefing, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, September 2005.

<sup>10</sup>United Nations General Assembly, *A more Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes*, A/59/565, New York, 29 November 2004, 46.

<sup>11</sup>United Nations General Assembly, *Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, A/60/825, New York, 27 April 2006, par. 7.

<sup>12</sup>White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, DC: GPO, September 2006), 7.

<sup>13</sup>United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism*, A/57/273 and S/2002/875 (identical documents), New York, 6 August 2002, par. 13.

<sup>14</sup>Shibley Telhami, *The Stakes: America in the Middle East: The Consequences of Power and the Choice for Peace*, updated ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 33.

<sup>15</sup>The MIPT Knowledge Base, available from <http://www.tkb.org/home.jsp>; Internet: accessed 23 December 2007. Cited in Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right* (New York: Times Books, 2005), 6.

<sup>16</sup>United States Congress, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, report for Congress prepared by Audrey Kurth Cronin, 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 28 August 2003, Committee Print Order Code RL32058, 9 Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32058>; Internet: accessed 23 December 2007. Cited in Robert Pape, *Dying to win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: The Random House, 2005), 4.

<sup>17</sup>Christian Caryl, "Why They Do It", *New York Review of Books* 52, no 14 (22 September 2005).

<sup>18</sup>Robert Pape, "Blowing Up an assumption," *New York Times*, 18 May 2005. Cited in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 247.

<sup>19</sup>United Nations General Assembly, *Uniting Against Terrorism*, par. 28.

<sup>20</sup>Pape, "Blowing Up an Assumption."

<sup>21</sup>International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Perspectives," *Strategic Survey 2003/4*, 8. Cited in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 251.

<sup>22</sup>National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *Overview of the Enemy*, staff statement no.15, presented at the 12<sup>th</sup> public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., 16 June 2004, 11. Cited in David Cortright and George A. Lopez, *Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 251.

<sup>23</sup>Elizabeth Bumiller, "Bush Cites Doubt America Can Win War on Terror," *New York Times*, 31 August 2004.

<sup>24</sup>Telhami, *The Stakes*, 177.

<sup>25</sup>Francis Fukuyama, "After Neo-Conservatism," *New York Times Magazine*, 19 February 2006, 62.

<sup>26</sup>Various media and Public Relations announcements by the Administration Officials and the proponents of Military Surge in Iraq. Cited in William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerrilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 206.

<sup>27</sup>William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerrilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 207.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid*, 208.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid*, 223.

<sup>30</sup>Dwight Eisenhower, “*humanity hanging from a cross of iron*,” Speech before the National Association of Newspaper Publishers, Washington, D.C., 16 April 1953. Cited in William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerrilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 223.

<sup>31</sup>Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 149.

<sup>32</sup>Arun Gandhi, “Terrorism and Nonviolence,” 24 September 2001; available from <http://www.alternet.org>; Internet; accessed 9 September 2007.

<sup>33</sup>David Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond: Nonviolence for an Age of Terrorism*. (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006), 18.

<sup>34</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup>Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1970), 4.

<sup>36</sup>Walter Wink, *The Powers That Be: Theology for a New Millennium* (New York: Galilee/Doubleday, 1998), 159.

<sup>37</sup>Cortright, 27.

<sup>38</sup>*Ibid.*, 212.

<sup>39</sup>Gandhi, 1.

<sup>40</sup>Carl Conetta, *Transformation of US Defense Posture: Is Nonoffensive Defense Compatible with Global Power? Project on Defense Alternatives*. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute. Paper presented at The Global NOD Network International Seminar *Non-Offensive Defence in a Global Perspective*, Copenhagen, 4-5 February 1995; available from <http://www.comw.org/pda/nodglob.htm> (Nov. 1996); Internet; accessed 10 October 2007.

<sup>41</sup>B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> rev. ed. (USA: First Meridian Printing, 1991), 338.

